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THE WALL OF SEPARATION
AND THE SUPREME COURT
LOREN P. BETH*

The fact that the First Amendment to the United States Constitution was an injunction only against the Federal Government
prevented the national courts and Government from being involved
in the struggle over separation before the Civil War. The adoption
of the Fourteenth Amendment did not immediately change this
situation, due to the emasculation of the Amendment's privileges
and immunities clause by the Supreme Court in the SlaughterHouse and succeeding cases." Nevertheless, the federal courts were
occasionally called upon to rule on the meaning of the First Amendment religious clause. The most important instance was the question
of Mormon polygamy. Since most Mormons were in Utah, which
was then a territory under federal jurisdiction, any action against
polygamy had to be taken by the federal authorities. Congress
precipitated the struggle by passing an act making plural marriage
a criminal offense. When Reynolds was convicted under this act,
the Supreme Court was forced to rule on its validity under the First
Amendment.- As far as we are concerned, the major questions involved were (1) was Christianity the law of the land, and did
polygamy therefore violate it? and (2) did the First Amendment
prohibit the Government from regulating such acts when they were
committed as a part of a religious belief?
The first question was sidestepped in Chief justice Waite's
opinion, for obvious reasons. In the first place, the court might
have had a hard time upholding the act on the basis that Christianity
was the law of the land, since the evidence on the point is conflicting.
Secondly, a declaration that polygamy was a violation of Christian
principles would be open to attack, for the Mormons were Christians, and as such had as much right to define Christian morality
for themselves as did any other sect. Therefore the Court was forced
to rule directly upon the constitutionality of the statute. Was the
prohibition of polygamy a violation of the religious liberty guaranteed by the First Amendment? In the nineteenth century or even
today a court could conveniently come to only one conclusion. The
Chief Justice quoted Jefferson to the effect that the civil officers may
interfere with religious practices when they "break out into overt
*Associate Professor of Political Science, Harding College.
1.

Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (U.S. 1873).

2. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145 (1878).
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acts against peace and good order." He went on to indicate that
polygamy had always been considered "odious" in most of Europe
and was punishable at common law, and that it had always been
an offense against society in this country. Furthermore, he continued, marriage is a civil contract and as such may be regulated
by the state. On these grounds the anti-polygamy statute and the
good order and peace of society were maintained.'
Here we see clearly the problem which John Locke' failed to
recognize: who is to decide the issue when the civil and the religious
spheres come into conflict? Locke dismissed the question by saying
that it would seldom if ever come up, but the Supreme Court could
not get around it so easily. The answer of the court is implicit but
obvious: when the interests of the state and those of religion conflict, the state must decide whether the question involves political
stability to a great enough degree to prohibit the religious practice.
Particularly in questions involving the public morals the state, not
the church, is supreme. Obviously the extent of gevernmental interference under such a doctrine depends not on any constitutional
restrictions, but on the sense of restraint and devotion to liberty
of those political authorities who make the decision. The value of
the separation principle, however, as Locke recognized, is that it
reduces the area of conflict between the political and the religious.
It cannot eliminate conflict, but it can minimize it. From the viewpoint of the political, such conflicts should be minimized because
they may arouse passions which will threaten political stability.
There can be no doubt that in the Reynolds case-regardless of the
correctness of the Court's view as to the immorality of polygamy the decision reached was the only one politically possible, in view
of the prevailing hostility to plural marriage. The threat to peace
and good order came not so much from the practice itself as from
the opposition it aroused. 5
In 1891 the Supreme Court stuck the judicial neck out somewhat farther when, in ruling that a church had the right to import
the minister of its choice from abroad (regardless of immigration
regulations), the Court, speaking through Justice Brewer, averred
not only that "this is a religious nation" but that "this is a Christian nation." He based this conclusion on an analysis of the wording of several of our most conservative state constitutions which,
3. Cf. Davis v. Beason, 133 U. S. 333 (1890).
4. A Letter Concerning Toleration 167 (Sherman ed. 1937).

5. This fact was explicitly recognized as regards blasphemy by the
Delaware court in State v. Chandler, 2 Harr. 553, 573 (Del. 1837).
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he said, "speak the voice of the entire people." 6 This seeming victory
for the forces of Christianity-for such a declaration could be used
to sanction many breaches of the separation rule-was, however,
beclouded by two aspects of Justice Brewer's opinion. First, the
declaration was in a sense an obiter dictunt, for the declaration that
this is either a religious or a Christian nation was not necessary
to the decision. Second, the Court's opinion indicated that Jewish
ministers as well as Christian could be freely imported, thus leaving
it somewhat in doubt whether it actually meant that this is a Christian nation or merely that this is a religious nation. In any case, this
doctrine has not been adopted by succeeding courts although it is
often cited by those who would have it so.
While the Supreme Court was thus kept out of the religious
field except where federal statutes were involved, the state courts
had to bear the burden of deciding whether religious instruction in
the public schools was a violation of the state constitutions, whether
the state constitution or common law made the state a Christian
state, and so on. The decisions are so different in various states that
no clear pattern can be derived from their study. But some of them
were important because they contained opinions about the separation theory which went beyond the language of pure law and entered
the field of political theory.
In the twentieth century the pendulum of constitutional interpretation has swung to the federal courts on the vital questions of
religious liberty. The Supreme Court opened the way for this
development by evading the Slaughter-Householding and not basing its protection of individual rights against state action upon the
privileges and immunities clause which the earlier case had made
a practical nullity. This development was foreshadowed by two decisions which, without referring to the First Amendment, held that
7
the liberty spoken of in the Fourteenth includes religious liberty.
It was not until the so-called "Roosevelt Court" that the First
Amendment religious clauses were specifically applied against the
states under the wording of the Fourteenth. s From then on it was
assured that the important religious cases would be appealed to the
Supreme Court of the United States. And they came in a flood.
In a case involving religious rights, there are many lines of
thought which a court can pursue in reaching its decision. None
6. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U. S. 457, 470, 471,
472 (1892).
7. Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Calif., 293 U. S. 245 (1934);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923).
S. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940).
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is either easy to apply nor precise in its application. Judicial determination in this field is "case by case;" precedents do not often
apply. Which methods of reaching a conclusion are taken in any
particular case are largely a result of the philosophy of the Court;
and the philosophy of the Court (even in these days of split majorities) is an amalgam of the individual philosophies of the justices.
Since 1940, the Court has almost unanimously adopted Madison
and Jefferson's theory of separation. There have been wide differences of opinion in each case, however, on just what Jefferson's
theory means and how it can be applied to present-day problems.
The methods used by various justices in various cases have been
as follows:
1. Historical.In several cases the Court has made a determined
effort to base its decisions on what the framers of the First Amendment meant to do. There is, as we know, much difference of opinion
on this point. But the Court has, in general, adopted Thomas
Jefferson's "wall of separation" theory, including (or adding, as
some critics claim) the idea that the state is barred from aiding one
religion, all religions, or any preference of one over another, as
Justice Black said in his famous Everson case opinion.9 In this case
and the later McCollum case, the Court has gone extensively into
the business of making, or as Corwin puts it, remaking, history. 10
It has thoroughly examined the background of the amendment, and
has decided that Jefferson's theory was embodied in it. Although I
believe this interpretation to be the correct one, it is unprovable
and controversial, and on the whole a poor basis for a decision if
used exclusively, for several reasons.
First, the brevity of Congressional debate and the lack of writings on the question by the framers make any historical argument
inconclusive and open to serious doubt. Second, the amendment was
designed to outlaw practices which had existed at the time-but
there is no authoritative declaration of the specific practices at which
it was aimed. And third, most of the modem cases involving religious freedom turn on issues which were at most academic in 1789,
and perhaps did not exist at all. Public education was practically
non-existent in 1789, so the question of religious education may not
have been foreseen. And the use of loudspeakers in public parks
was certainly not in the minds of the framers." The result is that
9. People ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203
(1948) ; Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947).
10. Corwin, The Supreme Court as National School Board, 23 Thought
(Fordham University Quarterly) 665 (1948).
11. See Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558 (1948).
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the historical argument can apply to many recent decisions only by
implication; the justices, in short, must apply their own opinions of
what Madison or Jefferson would think of the present-day problem
-a process which is fraught with the possibility of error, and which
Jackson remarks,
actually leaves the Court free to decide, as Justice
1 2
under "no law but our own prepossessions.
Another objection which liberals have to the historical method
is that in the hands of an illiberal court it may be actually dangerous
to religious freedom. It can as well be used-even if one accepts
Jefferson's theory of it-to limit freedom as to protect or enlarge
it. As one writer on the subject trenchantly remarks,
"The Founding Fathers were novices in the field of religious
freedom, for they had come from a background of bigotry and
lived in an era of intolerance .... It would be a strange commentary on the flexibility of our democratic government, if after
150 years of growth our concepts of freedom were limited to the
narrow horizons of our forefathers. The First Amendment, if
it is to keep step with the times, must give much wider protection than it did in 1789." 13
2. Political process. In one case the Court has taken the view
that it will not strike down state legislation, except in flagrant cases,
as long as the remedial processes of government leave open the possibility of agitation for repeal. Justice Frankfurter strongly urged
this view in his Gobitis case opinion, in which he said:
"Except where the transgression of constitutional liberty is too
plain for argument, personal freedom is best maintained-so
long as the remedial channels of the democratic process remain
open and unobstructed-when it is ingrained in a people's habits
and not enforced against popular policy by the coercion of
adjudicated law."14
Frankfurter reiterated this view in his dissent in the Barnettec case,
in which the Court reversed itself and over-rulled the Gobitis decision. As to the merits of the argument, there is a good deal of truth
and wisdom in Frankfurter's approval of the Holmesian dictum
that experimentation should be permitted in the "insulated compartments" of the states. But Holmes was referring to economic experi12. People ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S.203, 238
(1948) (concurring opinion).
13. Summers, The Sources and Limits of Religious Freedom, 16 Ill. L.
Rev. 57 (1946). The analysis of the historical method here given is taken
largely from this article.
14. Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586, 599 (1940).
15. West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624

(1943).
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ment, not to civil liberties. In any case, the constitutional principle
in civil liberties questions is clear: the state is barred from "experimenting" with the liberties which the Constitution guarantees. In
addition, while Frankfurter's faith in the democratic process is
touching, his theory is dangerously close to one of pure majority
rule. In this connection, he cited Madison and Jefferson as knowing
"that minorities may disrupt society ;'6 yet Jefferson and Madison
both also realized that majorities can disrupt society by trampling
on minority rights. This was, in fact, the main (and only) reason
for the inclusion of the Bill of Rights in the Constitution. It was
intended as a constitutional protection against the tyranny of a
majority which might disregard the fact that unalienable rights belong to minorities as well as majorities. To apply Frankfurter's
theory might well be to make the Bill of Rights a nullity-an eventuality which Frankfurter would dislike as deeply as anyone on the
Court.
3. Minority protection. It was this conviction that led Justice
Stone to make his lonely dissent to the Gobitis decision, a dissent
which was to become the majority opinion in the Barnette case.
Stone's thesis was that there are certain fundamental rights which are
constitutionally protected from state violation, and that the Court
is duty-bound to enforce these rights, even if it does mean a limitation on government action. He objected to Frankfurter's idea, because, he said, it meant "the surrender of the constitutional protection of the liberty of small minorities to the popular will,"'' and
advanced a contrary theory that the constitutional provisions do18
and were meant to-limit governmental action.
"The very fact that we have constitutional guaranties of civil
liberties and the specificity of their command where freedom of
speech and of religion are concerned require some accommodation of the powers which government normally exercises, when
no question of civil liberty is involved, to the constitutional demand that those liberties be protected against the action of government itself."' 19
16. Id. at 653 (dissenting opinion).
17. Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586, 606 (1940)
(dissenting opinion).
18. Frankfurter had feared that government's freedom of action would
be unduly restricted if the Court were to strike down "reasonable" legislation. In his Barnette dissent he called such court action "a denial of the
exercise of legislation." West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319
U. S. 624, 654 (1943) (dissenting opinion).
19. Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586, 602 (1940)
(dissenting opinion).
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His view was, in short, that national unity is a legitimate object of
governmental action, but that such action cannot abrogate constitutional limitations.
Stone's argument seems philosophically more tenable than
Frankfurter's, but it does not really solve the question in any particular case, since it gives no clue as to where civil liberty ends and
legitimate governmental action begins. There is no doubt, for instance, that in the Reynolds Mormon case, religious liberty was
denied and legislation approved, yet who doubts the correctness of
the decision? Stone's rule is no touchstone; in each case the Court
must still decide which interest is paramount: that of political and
social aims, or that of civil liberty. It is this enduring necessity which
makes liberty perpetually a thing which must be fought for, a
thing which must be continually reasserted as one of the predominant values in the competition for supremacy. Liberty must compete
with other values; and as far as the courts are concerned, the outcome of the competition depends not on a constitutional principle
but on the philosophical theories of the judges.
4. Preferredrights.Another rule which has been enunciated by
the Court, and which is also opposed to the Frankfurter theory, is
that which holds that some rights have a preferred status and should
be invariably protected by the courts. Frankfurter had maintained
that legislation should be upheld if it could be considered reasonable,
placing, apparently, the burden of proof on the aggrieved party. But
Justice Murphy took up the cudgels against this doctrine. Religious
liberty, he thought, was so sacred a privilege that the shoe should be
put on the other foot. That is, in a case involving religious rights,
the state should be required to prove that its action-as regards the
restriction of liberty-is reasonable. It will not do to prove its
reasonableness as general legislation; it must be reasonable in its
application to religious liberty. The presumption of the court, said
Murphy, should be that any violation of First Amendment rights
is "prima facie invalid."
"Religious freedom is too sacred a right to be restricted or prohibited in any degree without convincing20 proof that a legitimate
interest of the state is in grave danger.1
This preferential treatment of First Amendment freedoms is common if largely implicit with the Court in religious cases. 21
20. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 173-176 (1944) (dissenting opinion).
21. See Kunz v. New York, 340 U. S.290 (1951) ; Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U. S. 268 (1951); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U. S. 141 (1943);
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S.105 (1943).
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In matters where there is no specific constitutional prohibition,
the usual court rule-often ignored-is that there is a presumption
of constitutionality, and that if the law is considered by the Court
to be a reasonable exercise of some legitimate governmental power
such as the police power, the law should be sustained. There is
grave doubt, however, that such should be the case where there
is a clause in the Constitution which prohibitsgovernmental action,
especially when the prohibition is couched in such absolute terms as
those of the First Amendment. There is thus some value in Justice
Murphy's contention that when such prohibitions are involved, a
law should be considered invalid unless "convincing proof" of its
necessity be offered. Some, like Frankfurter, would fear that legitimate state action would be made impossible by such an interpretation; this need not be the case, however. For even with a presumption of unconstitutionality it is still necessary for the Court to decide
whether or not convincing proof has been presented. It is, in other
words, the Court which must be convinced. A court made up of
Frankfurter would doubtless be easier to convince than one made
up of Murphys. The shift in emphasis, in other words, would not
be as important as the makeup of the Court. Again, then, it is the
judges, rather than the rule of interpretation, which are of fundamental importance.
5. General applicability. The Court has sometimes held that
a law 6f general applicability is valid even though it interferes incidentally with religious liberties. This view is diametrically opposed
to that of Murphy discussed above, and the Court in each case has to
decide which of the two it prefers. The result generally depends on
the Court's ciew of the importance of the legislation and the degree
to which it impinges upon liberty. The rule of general applicability
was stated forcefully by Justice Frankfurter in the Gobitis case.
"The religious liberty which the Constitution protects does not
exclude legislation of general22scope not directed against doctrinal
loyalties of particular sects.

"The mere possession of religious convictions which contradict
the relevant concerns of a political society does not relieve the
citizen from the discharge of political responsibilities."2 3
It is doubtful, however, if most judges would go as far as
Frankfurter on this interpretation. The validity of the argument,
provided it is properly qualified, is undeniable. Its application in
a compulsory vaccination law case was undoubtedly wise.24 But as
22. Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586 (1940)
bus).
23. Id. at 594-595.
24. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11 (1905).

(sylla-

1954]

THE VALL OF SEPARATION

applied in a flag-salute case or a street-littering ordinance case, it is
of doubtful wisdom.25
The fact that Frankfurter gives no weight to the importance,
as distinct from the relevance, of the "concerns of a political society,"
is cause for comment. It is probable that he does not actually mean
that any relevant concern, expressed in a general law, would be
sufficient to uphold the law, regardless of how minor the subject
matter of the law may be. There is a vast difference in the importance
of laws regulating the holding of public meetings in parks, and laws
prohibiting plural marriage. Frankfurter's doctrine gives no weight
to such differences, however; it is enough that both types of law are
of "relevant concern" to society.
That Frankfurter himself does not completely agree with his
doctrine seems to be indicated by his Everson case dissent. No one
would deny that safe transportation to school is a relevant concern
of society; yet Justice Frankfurter agreed with his dissenting colleagues that such transportation could not be constitutionally provided to parochial school children.26 Obviously, more than mere
"relevance" must be considered. All things that are of relevant
concern are not thereby constitutional; if they were our Bill of
Rights would be deprived of much of its utility in protecting us from
governmental intereferences with our liberties.
Neither is the general scope of legislation a complete criterion of
its constitutionality in religious cases. It is obvious that laws of
general scope on their face, may be used to discriminate against particular groups. Southern evasions of the Constitution's suffrage requirements are an obvious case in point, and the courts have latterly
been very cautious in approving such evasions. The application of
the law, and not merely its scope, are of concern; and if a law of
general scope does in practice work against "the doctrinal loyalties
of particular sects," that is one factor which should be taken into
consideration by the courts. Scope, relevance, and importance and
effcct, are all part of the complicated picture which the courts should
consider before making decisions.
6. Interference with liberty of others. A sixth test that has been
proposed is the degree to which an action impelled by religious conviction impinges upon the freedom of others. This test involves a
balancing of freedoms. Justice Jackson proposed its use in his dissent in the Prince case, in which he averred that limitations on religious liberty should begin only when the actions affect those
25. Jones v. Opelika, 316 U. S. 584 (1942), rev'd on rehearing, 319
U. S. 103 (1943) ; see also Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158 (1944).
26. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 28 (1947).
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outside the religious group which condones or sanctions them.2 7
This argument has gained prominence recently largely because of
the Supreme Court's refusal to use it in the McCollum case. It requires an analysis of both freedom for and freedom from, as is well
brought out in the controversy over that case. The Court holds that
freedom from any element of coercion in religious matters is an
important factor. But others believe that their freedom for religious
instruction is more important than the freedom from it of a few
"atheists."
A leading constitutional authority has advanced this opinion:
"Have the parents of children who must for financial or other
reasons attend the public schools no right to guide the education of their children, and hence no right to demand that the education available through the public schools shall not be purely
secular? It would seem that the decision in the McCollum case
amounts to a law prohibiting the "free exercise" of religion-a
type2 8 of law which is in definite words banned by Amendment
I !"
And a prominent Catholic writer seconds it:
"This case was different. It was a matter of one child and its
parent against all the other children in the community. It was
decided in favor of the one child, but in this kind of case, what,
it can be asked, becomes of the freedom of religion of all the
others? Before, it was always the power of the state that was
restricted. Here, it is the freedom of other individual citizens
that is denied."2"
Laying aside the question of whether or not coercion did exist,
and assuming with the court that it did, it appears that the major
question in the McCollum case was whether the freedom from
coercion of the McCollum boy (and, possibly, others in like position) or the freedom of others to attend religious classes in public
schools on school time, is the most valuable. Since, given the will
on the part of parents, children, and church, religious education can
be secured outside the public schools, it would seem-again assuming that coercion existed-that the first freedom was actually the
one which most needed protection. At least the Supreme Court
thought so, by an (in these days unusual) overwhelming majority. 0
27. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 177 (1944) (dissenting
opinion). See also Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in Douglas v. Jean-

nette, 319 U. S. 157, 166 (1943).

28. Corwin, supra note 10, at 680.
29. Parsons, The First Freedom 178 (1948).
30. The significance of Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306 (1952), is

difficult to estimate. It is probable that it does not affect the argument here,
since the majority assumed there was no coercion involved in the New York
"dismissed-time" system.
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Whatever the decision in a particular case, it is, I believe, obvious that the balancing of freedoms is a tricky thing, and a job
which courts of law are not well qualified to handle. Yet under the
American constitutional system such questions inevitably present
themselves to the courts. It is the judges' own value heirarchy which
determines their answer, not a legal or constitutional principle.
7. Clear and present danger. The Court has at times attempted
to apply the Holmes-Brandeis "clear and present danger" rule to
religious liberty cases. Since such cases in this country seldom if
ever pose an actual threat to any government, the question resolves
itself into, not clear and present danger to the state, but instead,
to some paramount interest which the state feels bound to protect.
Obviously, once again this means the weighing of values, not the
application of principles of law. Justice Murphy used this concept,
as well as that of preferred rights, in his Prince case dissent. The
state, he said, had completely failed to prove the "existence of any
grave or immediate danger to any interest which it may lawfully
protect." 3' The majority disagreed. The same principle may have
been present in the minds of the justices in many of the other cases
which have been heard by the Court.32 It must be said that the difficulties in the way of applying the clear and present danger test
to subversive activities are multiplied when it is applied to religious
liberty cases. For at least there is no doubt that the state may legally
and morally protect itself against acts of subversion. But may it
protect itself against disunity, or irreligious tendencies, or streetlittering, or invasion of the privacy of the home, or unauthorized
parades, when these are relevant to the First Amendment? Here
enters the question, not only of whether the state can prevent such
activities at all, but also of whether the value of religious liberty is
not higher than the other value concerned. In the Cox case, the
Court was not merely concerned with "maintaining public order
without which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of unrestrained abuses."33 The real question was whether the holding of
unauthorized parades constitutes such an excess, especially when
31. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 174 (1944) (dissenting
opinion).
32. It seems implicit in the Mormon cases: Reynolds v. United States,
9S U. S. 145 (1878) ; Davis v. Beason, 133 U. S. 333 (1890). See also Taylor
v. Mississippi, 319 U. S. 583 (1943) ; Martin v. Struthers, 319 U. S. 141
(1943); West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624
(1943); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569 (1941); Minersville School
District v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586 (1940) ; Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197
U. S. 11 (1905).
33. Chief Justice Hughes for the majority in Cox v. New Hampshire,
312 U. S. 569, 574 (1941).
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the parade in question may be viewed as a religious exercise. The
Court in that case decided it was an excess; but obviously, given
a slightly different hierarchy of values on the part of several justices,
another conclusion might have been reached which would sound just
as logical when embalmed in judicial phraseology.
8. Unavoidability of clash. In Justice Murphy's hands, the clear
and present danger rule was easily turned into a doctrine that
"a basic liberty can be limited only to the extent that the clash
between its free exercise and the prevention of immediate substantive evil is unavoidable."3' 4 The use of such a doctrine would clearly
have led to a different decision in the Cox and Prince cases."5 It is
in actuality only an extension of the clear and present danger rule,
by the addition of the test of inevitability of effect-a test which
in some cases (though not in all) is no easier to apply. In the
Jacobson compulsory vaccination case, for instance, to have based
the decision on whether the lack of vaccination would have led "unavoidably" to a smallpox epidemic (which is what the authorities
were upheld in their power to prevent), would have been literally
impossible.3 6 But in some cases, as the Cantwell case, the test can
seemingly be applied easily by merely looking at what happened.
The state claimed that the actions of the Jehovah's Witnesses
threatened the peace. But the Court overruled this contention because no actual breach of the peace had occurred. A clash was obviously not unavoidable if it had been avoided.3 7 However, there
is a difficulty in this; for if the state were forced to wait until violations had occurred before it could act, its job of preventing such
violations or breaches of the peace would be impossible to carry out.
Preventive action is, in many cases, not only legitimate but necessary, a fact which the unavoidability test fails to recognize. It has
the value, however, of recognizing that proper watchfulness by the
civil authorities, by providing police protection or other means,
might often prevent any real threat of disorder, thus rendering unnecessary the prohibition or breaking up of the meeting. American
police authorities could learn a real lesson from the London police
in this connection.
This survey of the means by which a court can arrive at tenable
decisions in cases involving religious liberty emphasizes the fact
34. Summers, supra note 13, at 73.
35. See also Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568 (1942), in
which Murphy himself upheld the state's dignity against the religious freedom to curse its officials !
36. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11 (1905).
37. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940).
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that no hard and fast rule of law can be applied. In spite of the
fulminations of critics, it is clear that the Court can only proceed,
in Justice Frankfurter's words, "from case to case."389 It is for this
reason that the study of judicial decisions on religious liberty becomes in reality not a study of law (even of "constitutional" law)
but an excursion into political philosophy. From study of the Court's
philosophy it appears that the present justices almost unanimously
share the doctrines of Jefferson and Madison; and that, with these
as a basis, they add their own modern corollaries to fit present-day
needs, in accordance with their interpretations of the libertarian
spirit of those doctrines. Good grounds exist for the belief that the
Court in so acting is proceeding along the high road of liberty which
was blazed by Roger Williams and followed by the Revolutionary
statesmen. Whatever one's opinion on that, however, it cannot be
gainsaid that, for better or worse, the Court has made a significant
addition to the theory of separation. It has set up the standard that
no American government may "pass laws which aid one religion,
aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another."3 9 The "all
religions" phrase has aroused a ferment among some sincerely religious people; it apparently results from the Court's fear that any
aid, even ostensibly to "all religions," would inevitably in fact aid
one religion, or prefer one religion over another. It is another step
in the long road toward state neutrality, and it is made necessary
partly by the existence of a huge group of citizens-probably at
least 45% -who are not religious, and some of whom are irreligious. 40 Such people have the same civil rights as the religious, and
to tax or coerce them even for the aid of "all" religions would be
41
as unfair as to tax Presbyterians for the support of Methodism.
38, People ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203, 213
(1948) (concurring opinion).
39. Justice Black for the majority in Everson v. Board of Education,
330 U. S. 1, 15 (1947).
40. The Christian majority in America may also make the Court
particularly conscious of the rights of small minorities and of their need for
special protection.
41. Another grave and extremely interesting problem which has confronted the Court is the question of how much credence is to be given to the
protestations of sincerity made by the practitioners of strange and unusual
religious beliefs, such as, perhaps, snake tests. The Supreme Court met this
exceedingly difficult problem head-on in United States v. Ballard, 322 U. S.
78 (1944), which involved a case of what the Court felt was the old confidence game in a new guise, practiced by the leader of the "I am" cult. The
majority was inclined, for obvious reasons, to evade the issue of the sincerity of the defendant's religious beliefs. Justice Jackson wrote a particularly
perspicacious dissent, maintaining that a man's beliefs cannot be called insincere merely because they differ from the prevailing ones. A court, said
he, was in no position to judge the truth or falsity of any religious belief;
obviously it could not, therefore, pin the label of insincerity on a belief which
could not be proven false !

